While Stolorow et al may define intersubjectivity as the field of interaction between two subjects, Stolorow did not see it necessary that each of the two subjects recognize the other as a subject! Jessica Benjamin adds to the field of Intersubjectivity mutual recognition defined by seeing the other as a subject with an equivalent center of experience. Benjamin sees mutual recognition as the core of intersubjectivity, and presupposes that humans have 1) a need to be recognized, and 2) a capacity –though always unevenly manifest—to recognize an other, i.e. a capacity for mutual recognition.
While Stern et al note that very young infants have the capacity to recognize separateness [i.e. there is no fusion, symbiosis, or even autistic state, for that matter, as infants are interactive from birth] Benjamin distinguishes seeing the mother as separate as not the same as seeing her as a subject. While the mother’s recognition of the baby leads to its sense of agency, intersubjectivity is a developmental achievement also facilitated by the rapprochement crisis. While Mahler, from and ego/object perspective, saw the struggle for independence and the resolution of the crisis via internalization leading to object constancy, Benjamin, from an Intersubjective perspective, sees the crisis as a struggle between self assertion and recognition of the other, whose resolution is mutual recognition ['Mother has her aims, I can also have my own'] and the joy of sharing.
From Mitchell’s relational idea that the mind is not monadic, not an isolated mind, but, instead, interactional, and, therefore, psychoanalysis occurs between two subjects, Benjamin notes that Kohut’s self object experiences privilege the patient’s subjectivity and intimate that the analyst or other functions merely as an object to stabilize the self, ignoring the pleasure of mutuality between two subjects. She writes that it is the task of Intersubjective theory to explore the impediments to recognizing the other as a subject. Relational and Intersubjective theories hope to discourage the collapse of subjects into objects. Instead, they encourage holding in tension the many paradoxes of human experience: self-assertion and recognition; independence and interdependence; autonomy and relatedness; and in the clinical situation: intrapsychic and intersubjective; discovery and co-creation; interpretation and expressive interaction; understanding and experiencing .
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Jessica Benjamin and Intersubjectivity as a Developmental Achievment
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3 comments:
I really like Benjamin's work on intersubjectivity. I do not think Stolorow's work and Benjamin's work are contrary to each other. I suspect Stolorow is accurate in his belief that an intersubjective field does emerge between two people even if they do not recognize the mutuality of each other's influence. I see that as occurring in a more 'unevolved' developmental framework. I suspect that Benjamin's position allows for people to access and benefit more from the experience of intersubjectivity, because it calls for an awareness of the subjectivity of all parties. It reminds me a bit of Ken Wilbur's ideas on spectrum of consciousness.
Jean Austin-Danner
I really like Benjamin's work on intersubjectivity. I do not think Stolorow's work and Benjamin's work are contrary to each other. I suspect Stolorow is accurate in his belief that an intersubjective field does emerge between two people even if they do not recognize the mutuality of each other's influence. I see that as occurring in a more 'unevolved' developmental framework. I suspect that Benjamin's position allows for people to access and benefit more from the experience of intersubjectivity, because it calls for an awareness of the subjectivity of all parties. It reminds me a bit of Ken Wilbur's ideas on spectrum of consciousness.
Jean Austin-Danner
I found Stolorow interesting on several levels.
His phenomenology perspective and view of the therapist-patient interaction of systems seems intuitively true as opposed to the therapist being a blank slate. (Isn't this why we should all be analysed?) The extent of our personal exposure to the patient is still quite debatable. I though his physiologic phobia limited him so much in seeing what might be useful for patients.
His own personal suffering seemed so prolonged (as he port-keyed onto it during the afternoon) and then looked to medicate himself (not, heaven forbid with drugs) but with vodka. (Not that I am at all opposed to a good martini - but alcohol, of course, is a depressant). Well, I guess he suffers bravely, but it is not right to imply that his patients should do the same.
His discussion of trauma, I felt to be so limiting. Of course, trauma makes one feel more vulnerable and isolated out of control. There is a huge literature about that. His case of the woman with the flush and tremor showing "Clinically, it is the secondary feelings that often must be explored first, as patients may feel shame about exposing the trauma-induced feelings," could have opened a rich discussion of clinical approaches and presentations, from Dissociative Identity Disorder to all venues of trauma interpretation, understanding, intersystem exchange and physiologic displacements and treatments.
Certainly, his attentiveness and understanding of where each person is coming from is valuable in all interactions.
It was fascinating to look at that in his own interactions with each of us.
Bonnie Saks, MD
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