Aron enumerates
various ways we conceive of "something beyond the dyad” called the [analytic]
third: “a context within which we emerge, … an
emergent property of dyadic interaction and … a dyadic achievement that creates
the psychic space necessary for reflexive self-awareness and mentalization" (the understanding
that the other has contents of mind, as well, and different from one’s own—an
important and necessary component for mutual recognition of relational intersubjectivity).
What a recognition of paradox regarding the third: that we emerge from it, as
well as it from us, and it is something we create and utilize.
What makes the
analytic third so useful? Aron, and Benjamin, state that “thirdness…allows the
analyst to restore a process of identification with the patient’s position without
losing her own perspective.” This is a refreshing experience of learning
negotiation procedurally for a patient raised in an environment of negation (“where
the acceptance of one person’s subjectivity meant an obliteration of the other’s”).
Learned complementarity— your way or my way, no in between— can ensue, and
play out in the transference-countertransference dialectic, and an analytic impasse may result. Aron tells us
that this impasse can sometimes be averted by opening the intersubjective space
to create an analytic third where the analyst is open to the patient’s multiple
and contradictory identifications.
Benjamin delineates
two types of the third: The ‘one-in-the-third’ (the rhythmic third) — where
oneness is experienced in a rhythmic pattern between two such as reciprocal
speech or eye gaze, is dyadic and exists early (pre-oedipal) in relationship— and
the ‘third-in-the-one’ – where the conflict within the mind of one can act as a
third position. For some, like Britton, where
the ‘triangular’ space is created in the analyst’s mind, the mother's mind
creates the third position. For Benjamin, the rhythmic third emerges, not from
one mind, but from within the dyad. Her third-in-the-one (the intentional
third), on the other hand, says Aron, "creates a space for differentiation"
[from oneness], much like 'marking' (described
by Gergely when the mother gives her version of the infant's response,
differentiating her response as a reflective mirroring rather than one
generated from within her. The infant has the capacity to see the mother's
response as separate from its own.) Marking, then, is not a perfect match, but
a reflection, as well, of otherness, a kind of mirroring that "is a dyadic
phenomenon, functioning as a differentiating third point emerging between"
two people and, as such, does not
require a third person to separate the infant from the mother. Marking creates
the third-in-the-one [in the one dyad]. We can have both the connection, in the
one-in-the-third, and difference, in the third-in-the-one.
Aron notes
that the Lousanne group’s investigation of triangularity in infancy shows the
capacity at an early age to have triadic interactions between two people (e.g.,
from the mother’s mind emerges a third position) indicating that triangularity
can no longer be conceived as the hallmark of the oedipal phase. The child no
longer needs the primal scene (relationship of parents which excludes the
child) to have experience with the third. Rather, the child is privy to the emerging
third position within the mother’s mind. A third point of reference can emerge
from the dyad within the mind of one and, when shared, can facilitate self-reflection
and mentalization.
Aron points out how
certain self disclosures by the analyst can create thirdness in the analytic
dyad. When the analyst lets her mind be
known (when , e.g., she disagrees with herself or is of two minds [e.g. I
want to respond to your request for advice, but concerned that, if I do, I
would be too much like your controlling, know-it-all father”]— that is, where
analysts disclose "aspects of their inner processes"—a thirdness
is introduced in the dyad, where the disclosure itself can serve as the strange
attractor (from chaos theory, which allows the possibility to shake up linear thinking
and have a reconfiguration of elements). Aron writes, “[T]he analyst’s reflexive
self-awareness, a dialogue with one’s self, creates a third point.” When made
explicit, the patient becomes privy to the analyst’s mind, both its contents
and its way of working. It is this third
point of view which allows for the third space, and in this space, both analyst
and patient can think together about connection and difference.
See also on this same paper the post of Jan 27, 2013. Compare
and contrast it to ideas in Aron’s 1995 paper (in the post of Jun 8, 2014.)
Aron,
L. (2006). Analytic Impasse and the Third: Clinical implications of
intersubjectivity theory. Int. J. PsychoAnal., 87:349-368
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