Lansky delineates shame and guilt for us, and refers to the
classical literature to make his points. He describes shame as resulting from failure to live up to one’s aspirations
(ego ideal) and it signals fears of loss of relationship or separation and/or
fears of exposure with concomitant humiliation. Weakness, defectiveness,
vulnerability are all words patients might use to describe their shame. When
shame is triggered, it may result in impulsive action, such as the intimidation
of others (e.g. domestic violence) or compulsive binging, as one tries to
regain control over one’s disorganizing sense of weakness. Guilt, on the other hand, results from failure to live up to
superego expectations and can be used to defend against shame, for it gives a
sense of action (some committed transgression) rather than the helplessness or
powerlessness which evoke shame.
Shame is a hidden affect (there is shame in being ashamed), but
Lansky says that it is not the affect itself which is hidden, but the consequences
(social annihilation) of the affect. His idea alludes to the relational nature
of shame, though when shame is consequent to failure to live up to one’s ego
ideal it does not necessarily involve the other. Freud had previously noted
that neurotic symptoms were an attempt to hide from awareness that which would
evoke painful affect, as are defenses. (Not until 1926, in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, did Freud made explicit his signal theory of affect.)
Freud relegated shame to conflicts around toilet training, but
Erickson spoke closer to the problem in his stage Autonomy v. Shame and Doubt,
which is contemporaneous with Freud’s anal stage. Freud places guilt, and fear
of retaliation (by castration), in the oedipal phase, whose heir, as you may
recall, is the superego. Klein puts shame in the paranoid-schizoid position
when, in addition to fear of attack and destruction, the expectation of one’s vulnerability
being exploited by others with the intent to humiliate exists. Klein places
guilt in the depressive position, which for her precedes the oedipal phase,
when the infant becomes aware of the injury it inflicts on the mother. Kohut “divorced
the notion of shame from any notion of conflict”, but Lansky opines that had
Kohut linked ‘fragmentation anxiety’ in terms
of its failure to live up to an ego ideal of maintenance of self image and self
respect, Kohut might not have been so ostracized by the classical
psychoanalysis of his day.
My favorite nod to shame comes from Tomkins; He proposed that shame results from an interruption of joy.
[How felicitous is that to remind us to meet our children’s joy with our own!] Many
of the patients I see have indeed experienced the failure of their ‘love affair
with the world’ to be met with attuned parental joy. Analysts, too, are called upon
to meet our patients in the same direction affectively, though somewhat
modified and without the disorganizing intensity, if lucky.
What Lansky might have elaborated more is the analyst’s shame, a powerful impetus to our dissociation, as when
the struggle of our patients with their helplessness, their humiliation, and
fears, trigger our own. He does note that “the shame of others makes us feel
about ourselves what we do not like to feel: vulnerable, weak, powerless,
dependent, contingent, disconnected, and valueless” and that “the emerging
shame of the other stirs up our own difficulty bearing shame, our helplessness,
and our anxiety that we may prove defective and fail in our professional roles
because we, in facing the patient's incipient experience of shame, will be
found to have nothing effective to offer.”
Tomkins, S. 1963 Affect, Imagery,
Consciousness. Vol. II The Negative Affects New York: Springer.
1 comment:
So fascinating!
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